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Introduction 
On  22  July 1gr5,  the Council  of the  European  Com-
munities  adopted  a  resolution on  the  technological problems 
of nuclear safety (1). 
In order to help formulate  Community  policy in this 
field,  the  Economic  and Social Committee  decided to produce 
the  present Study. 
On  24  February  1976,  the Committee's  Bureau 
instructed the Section for Energy  and  Nuclear Questions  to 
draw  up the  Study.  The  Section approved  the  Stuqy  on 
24  March  1977  and  the Committee  adopted it at its 148th 
Plenary Session  on  28  April  1  gr7 •  Voting was  lm.animous  less 
one  abstention. 
(1)  OJ  No.  C 185  of  14  August  1975,  page  1. - 2  -
Analysis  of  the Background  to Nuclear Safety and 
Current Problems  in this Area 
1.1. Need  for an Overall Community  Approach 
Safety is a  vital factor in the industrial develop-
ment  of nuclear power  applications.  The  rapid large-scale 
development  in the nuclear field in several Member  States 
must  be  coupled with measures  to guarantee and maintain the 
safety of  (a)  workers  in the nuclear industry  (b)  the public 
at large.  Safety must  be a  top priority,  irrespective of 
economjc,  industrial and  political considerations. 
Safety precautions must  be  stepped up  to cope with 
new  problems  created by  the advance  in know-how  and  technology 
whose  experimental reliability must  help to minimize residual 
hazards.  This  is true for conventional reactors  and, 
especially so for new  types. - 3  -
1.1.3.  The  Commission  has  undeniably used its Euratom 
~reaty powers  in a  bid  to coordinate and  unify Member  States' 
action in this field.  However,  the growing relative impor-
tance  of nuclear energy calls for Community  alignment  through 
the vehicle of codified mandatory minimum  rules  (2)  which are 
binding on  each Member  State.  The  aim  of such rules would  be 
effective coordination of the safety measures  taken by Member 
States  in the various stages  of the nuclear cycle.  The  im-
plementation of a  Community  Code  necessitates a  substantial 
extension  of the Commission's  powers  to deal with these 
specific nuclear safety problems  and  therefore requires  a 
top-level political decision.  This  is a  fundamental matter, 
and  the  Commission  will have  to submit  concrete proposals  to 
the Council  of Ministers.  These  proposals would  have  to be 
dtafted in the light of discussions with Member  States' 
governments,  industrialists active in the nuclear sector and 
representatives  of the relevant trade unions. 
1.1.4.  Some  facts  which  warrant a  Community  Nuclear  Safety 
Code  are recapitulated below.  In some  cases,  the strictly 
n~clear safety aspects  involved are already covered  by 
(a)  the rules  of  the International Commission  on  Radiological 
Protection and  (b)  the  Euratom  Treaty. 
(2)  Definition of uniform standards to be  adhered to by all 
EEC  countries. - 4  -
a)  The  search for a  common  energy policy; 
b)  If accidents  occur at nuclear plants,  the  consequences  may 
well  extend  beyond  national frontiers;  this risk is par-
ticularly serious  in the  case  of reactors located in fron-
tier regions; 
c)  The  problems  attaching to  (i)  the free movement  of labour 
in  the  Community;  (ii)  the protection of workers;  and 
(iii)  the need to abolish inequalities  in this field and 
with regard to the protection of the general public; 
d)  The  international character of  (i)  the transport  of radio-
active material and,  in particular,  irradiated fuel; 
(ii)  the processing of irradiated fuel;  and  (iii)  the 
storage  of radioactive waste; 
e)  Technical solutions have still to be  found for certain 
problems  (siting criteria,  thermal  pollution,  radioactive 
waste  disposal,  etc.).  The  implications  of these  problems 
for mankind  transcend national frontiers  and  entail a  heavy 
responsibility towards  future generations; 
f)  Production costs may  vary,  in the  absence  of an adequate 
d~gree of alignment at Community  level; - 5 -
g)  The  existence of technical barriers to nuclear plant 
sup~lies within the  Community; 
h)  The  need to  ensure that fissile materials are  employed 
solely for  the purpose  declared by their users.  Under 
the Euratom  Treaty the Commission  is directly responsible 
for  implementing this rule.  Agreements  on  this matter 
should be negotiated at international level. 
1.2. Analysis  of the  Back5round  to Nuclear Safety 
1.2.1.  Nuclear safety is an  extremely broad field.  Quite 
apart from  the technological options and  the precautionary 
measures  which have  to be  decided upon at the design stage, 
safety depends  upon  a  large number  of factors.  The  risks 
inherent  in the production  of nuclear energy therefore have 
to be  calculated, not only an  the basis of the potential 
dangers  of nuclear plants,  but also in the light of  the  con-
siderable  complexity of reactors  and  the fuel  cycle,  from  the 
mine  right through to the storage of wastes.  The  techno-
logical  options  themselves are linked to scientific and  tech-
nical research,  though a  satisfactory solution can be  found 
only  in  close liaison with industrial practice.  Both  of these 
factors  are part of a  genuine safety policy.  There  is no 
reason to be  complacent simply because  everything has  gone  well - 6  -
so  far and  there have  been  few  accidents  in the nuclear power 
industr;y-.  It must  be  remembered  that hitherto the develop-
ment  of this  industry has  been  slow and  cautious.  The  problem 
to be  faced  today is how  to ensure nuclear safety at a  time 
when  faster progress is being made  towards large-scale pro-
duction.  Research will be necessary to solve the difficulties 
which still exist. 
Since  the  establishment of the European Atomic 
Energy  Community,  Council action in the field of radiological 
protection and nuclear safety has  concentrated on  : 
- The  drawing up  and  promulgation in 1959  of directives laying 
down  basic standards for the protection of workers  and the 
general public against the dangers  arising from  ionizing 
radiations  (Articles  2(b),  30,  31  and  218  of the  Euratom 
Treaty); 
- The  amendment  of these radiological protection standards in 
the light of  progress in scientific knowledge  (in 1962,  1966 
and  1  '!76)  under Article  32  of the Euratom  Treaty; 
- Supervision of the  extent to which  the principles of radio-
logical protection and  the values'laid down  in the basic 
standards are  implemented in the· laws,  regulations end 
afu~inistrative provisions  of the Member  States  (Article 2b) 
and  Article  33  of the Euratom Treaty); - 7  -
- Community  level consultation on  all radioactive waste pro-
jects proposed  b,y  the Member  States which,  if implemented, 
would  be  liable to expose another Member  State to radio-
active contamination  (Article  37  of the  Euratom  Treat,y); 
- Steps  to harmonize  individual dose monitoring (inter-
comparison  programmes,  technical recommendations); 
- Measures  to provide  information and  training in the field 
of radiological protection; 
- Execution of  "direct" nuclear safety research projects in 
the Joint Research Centre.  The  fields  covered  include 
reactor safety,  resear.ch into actinides and  plutonium fuels, 
management  of nuclear material and  radioactive wastes; 
- Execution  of "indirect" research projects in the fields  of 
biology and  health protection,  radioactive waste manage-
ment  and  storage,  and  plutonium recycling in light-water 
reactors; 
- Approval  of a  resolution  on  the technological problems  of 
nuclear safety. - 8  -
1.2.3.  The  basic standards  on  the  protection of workers  and 
the  general public against  ionizing radiation are undoubtedly 
the most  important  achievement  of the  EAEC.  These  standards 
were  adopted  in  1959  (3),  and  amended  in 1962  (4),  in  1966  (5) 
and again  on  1  June  19'76  (6).  The  appendices to this Study 
include a  summary  of planned and  current research projects, 
and  the  Council Resolution of 22  July  1975  an  the Technological 
Problems  of Nuclear Safety. 
1.2.4.  Nuclear safety requirements differ, as  do  the methods 
employed  to fulfil them.  There are also differences as 
regards licensing procedures for the siting,  construction and 
operation of nuclear plants.  As  lang as  these differences  do 
not  jeopardize safety,  they are acceptable in the current 
"de facto"  situation. 
1.2.5.  Amongst  the differences which may  make  it difficult 
to align safety regulations,  mention may  be made  of the 
following  : 
! 
4635l)  O~og  lfNNNoooo  ••••  J4  ~~  ~0  J~;~  1959 
206  of  26  November  1966 
L  187  of 12  July 1976. - 9 -
a)  Differences  in the types  of reactors  chosen  :  for  example, 
only three Member  States have fast breeder reactors,  and 
only five have  reprocessing plants;  as far as  the repro-
~essing of irradiated oxide fuels  is concerned,  these 
plants - including those of commercial  scale - are still 
in the prototype stage. 
b)  Differences  in technological features  which have  a  bearing 
on  plant safety  :  e.g. different types  of shielding for 
light-water reactors  of the  same  rating and for storage 
ponds  for  irradiated fuel;  emergency  cooling systems  of 
different designs and  capacities;  different forms  of pro-
tection against natural catastrophes,  sabotage,  missile or 
aircraft attack and  core meltdown; 
c)  No  Member  State makes  explicit allowance for the rupture 
of a  LWR  vessel in safety calculations, for such ruptures 
are considered to be  extremely  improb&ble. Opinions  differ 
on  the need to cater for such a  rupture,  especially in 
densely populated areas; 
d)  Differences  in engineering solutions for  emergency  cooling 
systems; - 10  -
e)  Differences  in certain Member  States  in  (a)  procedures for 
gainine access  to safety reports  and  in  (b)  the  contents  of 
these reports; 
f)  Differences  in the ways  and means  in which  ordinary 
citizens can  play a  part in the licensing procedures for 
nuclear plants. 
There are further  cases  where  shortcomings  and 
needs  are apparent  : 
a)  The  continuous reprocessing of spent  LWR  fuel still in-
volves  certain technical difficulties.  World  reprocessing 
capacity is inadequate.  This means  that fuels  from nuclear 
power  stations which are not reprocessed must  be stored in 
ponds.  This state of affairs - which  can  only be  tolerated 
on  a  temporary basis - will create further storage and 
therefore safety problems.  For all these reasons,  in-
cluding the safety aspect,  adequate reprocessing capacities 
must  be  established. 
b)  Highly radioactive liquid waste,  which is stored in tanks 
at the moment,  will have  to be solidified in a  suitable 
~ey.  Processes are being developed and tested. - 11  -
c)  It would  appear necessary to improve  safety concepts  and 
techniquec  in areas where new  developments  are taking 
shape,  particularly with respect to reprocessing plants, 
retention systems  for radioactive gases  (krypton 85, 
iodine)  and  liquide (tritium,  other radionuclides)  which 
are released to the  environment,  emergency  cooling systems 
for vessels  containing fission products and  protection 
against aircraft and missiles. 
d)  Fast breeder reactors  pose  specific safety problems  due  to 
the use  of sodium  as  coolant and  plutonium as  a  fuel  in 
compact  form.  These  features  create problems  at the trans-
port  and  spent-fuel reprocessing levels.  The  examination of 
these  problems  and  their solutions at Community  level will 
have  to go  hand-in-hand with the  development  of fast 
breeder reactors. 
e)  Although plutonium ie being produced and handled in only 
small quantities at the moment,  the drawing up of Community 
·safety rules  an  the industrial use  of plutonium must  be 
coupled with the  launching of  a  programme  for either plu-
tonium  recycling in light-water reactors  or the use  of 
plutonium as  a  fuel in fast breeder reactors; - 12  -
f)  As  yet, not  enough  experience has  been gained with regard 
to solutions for  the long-term storage  of radioactive 
waste.  Although certain processes  seem  to be suitable for 
the reprocessing and definitive disposal  of such waste, 
the technical criteria are  inadequately proven.  Storage 
in liquid form  in reprocessing plants is only a  stop-gap 
measure.  Some  headway has  been made  in France  and  Germany 
with processes for vitrification of high-level waste. 
Nevertheless,  vitrification is only  in its infancy; 
g)  In assessing the risks  involved in the transport  of radio-
active material,  and  irradiated fuel  in particular,  insuf-
ficient allowance has  been made  for  the very rapid increase 
in the scale and  diversity of such risks and  their in-
creasingly international character.  It is necessary to 
determine  which  of the various modes  of transport are 
safest.  In addition,  a  study should be made  of the case 
for the creation of "nuclear parks"  for the precise pur-
pose  of limiting shipments  of certain radioactive materials. - 13  -
1.2.7.  Although  the military use  of nuclear energy is not 
a  central  theme  of  this  Study,  the Committee  cannot  ignore 
the resultant risks  to which  the  public is  exposed.  Con-
sequently,  the Committee  thinks  that the safety rules  em-
bodied  in the Code  should  apply  just as strictly to nuclear 
installations that are used for military purposes.  Simi-
larly,  when  nuclear installations to be  used for peaceful 
purposes  are  exported,  the Community  must  ensure  that these 
safety rules are also written into the contracts. 
Part  2  :  A Community  Nuclear Safety Code 
2.1. Factors  to be  considered when  a  Community  Code  is being 
drawn  up 
2.1.1.  Several Committee  Opinions  should be  taken  into 
account  when  a  nuclear safety code  is drawn  up.  These are 
- the  Opinion  of  29  May  1975  on  the  Communication  from  the 
Commission  to the Council entitled "Programme  on  Radio-
active Waste  Management  and  Storage"  (7); 
- the  Opinion  of  29  May  1975  on  the Communication  from  the 
Commission  to the Council  on  the Technological Problems  of 
Nuclear Safety  (8); 
(7)  OJ  No.  C  263  of  17  lfov•ber 1975,  page  46 
(8)  OJ  No.  C  263  of  17  November  1975,  page  52 - 14  -
- thP  ~dditional Opinion  of  29  October  1975  on  the  Com-
munication  and  Proposals  from  the  Commission  to the 
Council  entitled  "Towards  a  New  Energy Policy Strategy 
for  the  Community"  (g). 
Various  Commission  departments  have  carried out 
work  on  nuclear safety,  and  as  a  result the Community  has  a 
sound  base for progress  on,  inter alia,  basic safety stan-
dards  for protection against  ionizing radiation,  research 
programmes  and  coordination between the Member  States  on  the 
technological aspects  of nuclear safety.  This work has  been 
in progress for several years,  and  seeks  to bring about  a 
gradual  alignment  of national nuclear safety rules.  In 
addition,  the  systematic move  to align the  technological 
aspects  of safety which has  been  in progress for four years, 
must  be  continued. 
The  Committee  considers  that the Code  would  be  a 
logical sequel to the above measures,  since it would  provide 
an  overall framework within which they could be  expanded. 
(9)  OJ  No.  C  15  of  22  January  1973;· page  21. - 15  -
2.1.2.  The  following steps should  be  taken with a  view to 
achieving this alignment  : 
a)  A comparison  should  be  made  of  (i) nuclear plant con-
struction programmes  in the various Member  States and 
(ii) national and  Community  research and  experimental pro-
grammes  in the field  of safety and  protection.  The  Com-
mission has  already published a  report  an  the matter and 
is continuing its attempts to bring about  concerted,  co-
ordinated action  (10); 
b)  A comparative survey should  be made  of the differences 
between Member  States as regards safety technologies, 
criteria and  standards,  measures for protecting workers 
and  the general  public  and  the  basic features  of procedures 
and  legislation concerning the building of nuclear plants. 
The  Commission  has  also carried out work  in this field  and 
this is reflected,  inter alia,  in the publication of a 
number  of reports  (11)  (12); 
(10)  Doc.  EUR  5394e  (1975)  "European Community  L]ght-Water 
Reactor Safety Research Projects - Experimental Issue". 
(11)  Doc.  EUR  5?.84e  (1974)  "Authorization Procedure  for the 
Construction and  Operation of Nuclear Installations 
within  the Member  States"• 
(12)  Doc.  EUR  5362e  (1975) 
11Catalogue and  Classification of 
Technical  Safety Rules for Light-Water Reactors  and 
Reprocessing Plants". - 16  -
c)  Sto~k should  be  taken  of  the  extent to which  the  "basic 
standards  (established pursuant  to Articles  30  ff.  of 
the  Euratom  Treaty)  for  the protection of the health of 
workers  and  the general  public against the dangers 
arising from  ionizing radiations" have  been  enforced. 
While  recognizing the  efforts which  the Community  has 
made  in the field  of radioprotection since  1958,  the 
Committee  urges  the Council and  the Commission  to further 
intensify these efforts; 
d)  A critical study should  be  made  of the way  in which the 
Member  States are applying safety rules,  and  the  changes 
needed  in these rules  in view of  the transition from 
prototype to commercial plants; 
e)  Steps  should be  taken to ensure that,  as requested in 
the Committee's  Opinion of  29  May  1975  on  the Techno-
logical Problems  of Nuclear Safety,  the Commission  does 
not solely formulate  "recommendations  of a  general nature 
••••••••••••  but also creates the  conditions necessary for 
the  issuing of directives and  regulations in this field, 
in order that it may  thereby lay down  minimum  standards 
for all nuclear plants in the Community"; - 17  -
f)  A ctudy should  be made  of the extent  to which  proposed 
programmes  are consistent with safety requirements at 
all levels  (in the light of  the  current situation and 
expected future  trends); 
g)  The  levels  of  physical protection in the various Member 
States should  be  compared  and  standardized. 
2.2.  Fundamental Principles  of the Code 
The  Code  must  clearly identify the  procedures  by 
which  the  Community,  the Member  States,  their national  or 
regional  institutions and  the relevant representative 
bodies  are to  be  involved in drafting,  implementing and 
improving safety rules. 
2.2.2.  In view of the major interests at stake,  the 
Council muat  make  the Code  mandatory.  This  implies that the 
Commission  must  have  powers,  after the  interested parties 
have  had  an  ample  objective say,  to  ensure that each 
Member  State observes  the Code.  As  has  already been  pointed 
out  in this  Study,  the risks attached to nuclear plants 
transcend political frontiers  and  may  affect people living 
outside  the Member  State in which the plant is located,  as 
well  as  those living in that State.  The  fact that the Code 
is to be  binding on  the Member  States  implies  a  certain 
increase in the powers  of the Commission  in this vital area. 
Although  the Euratom Treaty  empowers  the Community  to 
regulate radiation protection,  etc., safety rules  and 
licensing procedures  have  remained a  national matter.  In 
view of the factors  analyzed in the first part of this Study, - 18  -
Article  203  of  the  Euratom  Treaty and  Article  235  of  the 
EEC  Treaty will doubtless  have  to be  invoked to bring 
safety rules more  within the  ambit  of  the Community. 
The  Economic  and  Social Committee  and  the 
European Parliament must  be  involved in the drafting of 
the  Code  and  must  be  consulted  on  any subsequent amendments. 
From  the  outset the Code  must  be  designed so that it can  be 
up-dated in the light of advances  stemming from  operating 
experiences  and research. 
The  Code  must  solely reflect safety requirements 
in the strict sense and  must  not  infringe on  personal and 
public liberties  (free choice  of  employment,  right to work, 
employment  possibilities, etc.). 
2.2.5.  The  Code  must  lay down  minimum  safety require-
mPnts  for nuclear plants  and for the protection of occu-
pationally-exposed workers  and  the general public against 
radiation. - 19 -
2.2.6.  Safety ef werkers ani tae public must  be  the  over-
ridiag criterion wkea  technical an•  economic  decisi•as are 
taken.  This  implies that decisions will also have  to  take 
accouat  of environmental damage  ani  long-term hazaris. 
2.2.7.  The  Code  must  be  adaptable, not rigid.  It must  be 
able  to  keep  pace  with progress ma4e  as a  result of research 
or of practical experience  in the  operation of installations. 
Therefore,  the  Coie  must  be  based  on  constantly updatei iata 
81'1i  iirectly related. research progra.JIIIes  covering,  for ex8JII.ple, 
nuclear safety technology  (reactors,  reprocessing of waste, 
stora~e) as well as biology and  meiicine  (cumulative  long-term 
effect of regular low  doses of ra4ioactivity,  internal contami-
nation caused  by  the  absorption of different radionuclides, 
biological conoeatration in food  chains). 
The  purpose  of this principle is to  eliminate the 
obvious objection to use  of the wort  "Code".  The  codification 
of safety rules is inconceivable unless it keeps  abreast of 
progress and is linked to an extensive research programme  with 
con8iterable  financial backing.  This does not mean,  however, 
that the rules will be  in a  constant state of flux.  In order - 20  -
t~  all~w sound  plannin~ of large-scale investments,  the basic 
safety standards must not  be  amendei  constantly.  On  the 
other hand,  safety rules must  be  adapted to advances in scien-
tific and  technical knowledge. 
2.3.  Geographical Area  Covered 
The  Coie  would  have  to  be  valid in all Meaber  States. 
2.4.  Activities Coverei by  the  Code 
2.4.1.  The  Code  must  cover all fields of nuclear  ener~ 
research and  application, viz. 
- uranium  (and,  possibly,  thori.ua)  Jlines; 
- ore-processing plants; 
- uranium-enrichaent plants; 
- fuel  fabrication installations; 
- reactors  : 
•  present-day nuclear power stations  (HWR,  GGR,  LWR), 
•  future nuclear power stations  (HTR,  FBR), 
•  small-scale reactors  (especially for the production of 
heat), 
•  research and experimental reactors; - 21  -
- nuclP.ar  research installations; 
- storage  of irradiated fuel; 
- transport of irradiated fuel  and  waste; 
- reprocessing of irradiated fuel; 
- storage  and  disposal of radioactive waste; 
- decommissioning and  dismantlement  of nuclear plants. 
2.4.2.  Radioisotopes are used  outside  the  field  of nuclear 
research and  the nuclear industry for medical,  industrial, 
a~icultural and  otker applications.  The  relevant  safety stan-
darts must  likewise  be  aligned  througnout  the EEC,  but  ~his 
suDject is not  a  matter for the present  Study. 
2.5.  Field of Application of the  Code 
The  points set out  below have  a  bearing on  the pro-
blems  listed under 1.2.4. 
2.5.1.  Protection of the  general public  and  the  environment 
a)  Criteria forselectingsites in the light of (i)  the natural 
and  industrial environment,  and  (ii) population density. - 22  -
b)  St~dards for discharge  of warm  water into lakes,  rivers 
and  oceans  (thermal pollution). 
c)  Implications for technical standards of research into the 
climatic effects of tower  cooli~. 
d)  Measures  to ensure that radioactive emissions do  not con-
stitute a  hazard  for workers and  the  general public  (mini-
.um release of g.aseous  and  liquid radioactive wastes to the 
environment  from all nuclear installations starting with 
uranium mines  and  up  to  and  including waste dumps). 
e)  Details of Member  States'  licensin~ procedures for the  con-
struction and  operation of nuclear plants,  and  technical 
aspects of such authorizations. 
f)  Procedures for informing and  consulting the  general public 
its elected bodies and  representative organizations. 
~) Measures  for physical protection of installations. 
h)  Procedures for authorizing transport operations  (including 
from  the physical protection  an~le). 
i)  Special provisions  for installations in frontier areas. - 23  -
It is necessary to pinpoint the responsibilities to 
be  shouldered at local,  regional, national and  EEC  level with 
regard  to  each of the  above  points. 
2.5.2.  Safety and  protection of workers in nuclear plants 
and  installations  : 
a)  Training and  briefing of workers with the assistance of 
their trade union organizations by  independent experts 
employed  or recognized by  the authorities. 
b)  Definition of uniform standards for protection against 
ionizing radiation,  to  be  adheret to by all EEC  Member 
States  (minimum  rules). 
c)  Checking of provisions  so  as to determine  to what  extent 
applications of the  findings of recent research can help 
to protect the  general public  and  workers  from  exposure 
to radiation. 
d)  Need  for each nuclear plant to have its own  radiation pro-
tection service coming under the responsibility of the 
plant operator but with the authority and  means  to act at 
any  moment  independently of operating and  productio.a units. 
!he Committee  welcomes  the  fact that considerable account 
of its suggestion on  the creation of radiation protection 
services has been taken by the Council Directive of 
1  June  1976  laying-down the revised basic safety standards 
for the health protection of the general public andworkers - 24  -
agajnst the dangers of ionizing radiation.  The  Directive 
states that  "The  creation of a  specialized radio-protection 
unit shall be  required for all establishments in whichthere 
is a  serious risk of exposure  or contamination.  !he unit, 
which may  be  shared by  several establishments,  shall be 
distinct from production and  operations units". 
e)  Special measures for outside labour working in nuclear 
plants  (these workers are often most  at risk.  They  are 
not  always  adequately trained and  briefed with regard to 
hazards,  and  their medical supervision is at present very 
difficult)  :  Operators must  be  made  responsible  for check-
ing the health of these  outside workers and  measuring the 
radiation levels to which they are  exposed  when  working in 
nuclear plants.  This  would  mean  that their medical records 
would  have  to be  at the operators' disposal.  ~hese require-
ments are already satisfied to a  large extent in someMember 
States. 
f)  Introduction of a  "nuclear passport"  for all workers in the 
nuclear industry.  The  passport  would  state where  the holder 
has  worked  and  the radiation doses to which he  has  been ex-
posed.  To  all intents and  purposes,  this system is already 
being operated in a  number of Member  States.  Two  copies of 
the nuclear passport should  be  kept,  one  by  the holder and 
the  other by  the medical service concerned.  Both copies 
should  be  constantly updated. - 25  -
g)  StaLlardization of the  instruments  and  units used  for mea-
suring radiation doses,  in order to facilitate checks  and 
make  statistical studies possible. 
2.5.3. Technical aspects of safety 
a)  Definition of minimum  standards  for the  discharge  of radio-
active effluents. 
b)  Definition of minimum  plant-safety conditions,  consistent 
with the proposals currently being drafted by  the Inter-
national Atomic  Energy  Agency  : 
- intrinsic safety, 
-Acts of God  (earthquakes), 
- Acts  of human  aggression  (theft of fissile materials, 
sabotage,  conventional and  other forms  of armed  conflict), 
- Explosions,  plane crashes. 
c)  Need  for physical protection standards for nuclear materials, 
enforceable  throughout the  Community. 
d)  Definition of rules for the  shipment  of fissile materials. - 26-
Part  3 
General Problems Posed by Nuclear Safety 
3.  1. Nuclear Safety and Public Opinion 
3.1.1.  When  the risks involved in the production of nuclear 
energy are being calculated and  decisions are being taken on 
whether or not these risks are acceptable,  the  most  important, 
intractable and  least-studied problems  are often more  of a 
social and moral  than a  technical nature.  There is an urgent 
need  to  provide for the general public clear,  comprehensible 
and objective information to  which  every citizen has  access. 
It is up  to  the experts to  provide the information needed to 
enable the issues to  be  debated.  The  debates  must  be 
thorough and  all the different arguments  must  be given a 
hearing.  The  experts must  de$cribe  the situation as it is, 
and stress the advantages,  hazards  and uncertainties.  In 
the final analysis the decisions which have  to  be taken are 
political and  involve  the whole of societ,y.  It follows that 
everyone,  and not  just the experts,  must  have  access to infor-
mation in order to  be  able to  give their views  through demo-
cratic channels,  through their elected representatives. 
3.1.2.  We  would  illustrate this need by listing three 
fields in which nuclear safety has particularly marked  social 
and political implications  : - 27-
- plans for emergency  action; 
- siting of nuclear plants; 
- supervision by public authorities. 
3.2. Plans for Emergency  Action 
3.2.1.  In keeping with the Safety Code,  the Member  States 
must  retain sole responsibility for drawing up,  and if neces-
sary  implementing,  plans for intervention and  emergency 
action.  To  preclude panic in the  event of accidents  (even 
minor ones),  the members  of the public directly concerned 
must  be  involved adequately  and  to  the extent necessary for 
these plans to  be  implemented in practice. 
3.3. Siting of Nuclear Plants 
3.3.1.  Decisions  on the siting of nuclear plants must  be 
submitted  to  elected bodies  and  to  the general public for 
their views.  Above  all,  those sections of safety reports 
which  do  not  jeopardize industrial secrets must  be  made  pub-
lic.  In the Community  in particular,  a  different problem 
is posed by  the siting of nuclear plants in densely-popu-
la.ted areas or in industrial  zones.  In such instances, 
the large scale evacuation of people following  even a  minor 
accident is a  risky matter.  Furthermore,  a  safety threat - 28  -
i)  ~uclear plants is posed by  the possibility of accidents 
in conventional industrial installations  {chemical  works, 
petroleum plants  and  gas piplines where  there is the risk 
of fire or explosion).  Special attention should be  paid 
to  this problem at EEC  level,  in view of the plans to 
build nuclear plants in border areas. 
3.3.2.  On  10  December  1976  the Commission sent the Coun-
cil two  proposals  entitled •consultation at Community 
level on the Siting of Power Stations"  and  "The  Introduc-
tion of a  Community  Con•ultation Procedure in respect of 
Power Stations likely to  affect the 'ferri  to-ry of Another 
Member  State"  (13)_.  The  Committee  delivered its 
Opinion on these proposals on 30  March  1977  (14). 
3.4. Supervision bz Pu9*ic  Authorities 
3.4.1.  Compliance with safety measuree  and  provisions 
must  be  supervised.  We  must  therefore consider how 
society and  the public authorities  can oversee eafety in 
the nuclear industry. 
(13)  OJ  No.  C 31  of 8  February  1977 
(14)  Doe.  CES  382/77 - 29  -
In this connection all Member  States should set 
up  one or more  public nuclear plant safety bodies.  These 
would  be  responsible for studying and  applying the  Com-
munity  Code  and  be  answerable  to  the appropriate Ministry. 
Committees  composed  not only of leading scientific figures 
but  also  of representatives of trade unions,  employers' 
associations  and professional bodies  involved in the  imple-
mentation of safety measures would assist the Ministry. 
Safety reports  should be  drawn up  periodically 
on  each nuclear plant.  These  reports  should review the 
extent  to  which  the safety measures  recommended  in the Com-
munity  Code  have been implemented  and  should also list any 
problems which  have arisen in this area.  The  Reports 
should be  forwarded to  the authorities concerned and  to 
the  "committees"  assisting the  "public nuclear plant safety 
bodies". 
Since this is an area of activity where  the 
"public service"  aspect is of overriding importance all 
nuclear plants  and  all activities associated with the fuel 
cycle must  be directly supervised by the public authori-
ties, particularly from  the safety angle. - 30-
3.4.5.  In view of the long-term safety requirements,  it 
is moreover vi  tal that,  in the present state of industrial 
applications,  the reprocessing of irradiated fuel  and the 
storage of waste  should be placed under direct public re-
sponsibility,  as long as  these activities remain insepar-
able. 
3.4.6.  The  Community,  acting through national bodies, 
must  supervize the international transport of fissile 
materials. 
3.4.  7.  The  Community  should therefore enact minimum  pro-
visions stating to what  extent national supervisory bodies 
should inspect nuclear plants  and how  often.  SUch  inspec-
tiona should cover not only plants but also the organiza-
tional side.  Findings  from  inspections  should be  analysed 
by  the  Cormnu.ni ty a:uthori  ties and made  available to all 
nuclear plant operators. - 31  -
Chapter 4  - Conclusions 
4.1.  While  notill8 its own  comments  on  29  ~  1975 
(Opinion on the Technological  Aspects of Nuclear Safety) 
on the efficiency of safety measures  and  systems used so 
far in respect of the building and  runnill8 of nuclear 
plants,  the Committee  notes  that the Opinion stressed 
the need for Community  rules in this area.  The  Com-
mi ttee asked  "whether the proposed measures will be 
sufficient to  enable the early introduction of common 
laws,  regulations  and  administrative provisions,  and 
common  nuclear technology rules and  directives bearing 
in mind  that the Community  is responsible not only for 
safety and  protection of public health,  but also for 
the operation of the  common  market". 
4.2.  The  same  Opinion adds  :  "The  Commission  should 
also  make  a  positive endeavour not merely to  formulate 
recommendations of a  general nature under Article  124 
of the EAEC  Treaty,  but  also  to -create the conditions 
necessary for the issuing of directives and  regulations 
in this field,  in order that it may  thereby lay down 
minimum  standards for all nuclear plants in the Conununity". - 32-
4.3.  The  Committee  therefore thinks that the present 
Study's  recommendations  for a  Community  nuclear safety code 
are consistent with  (i) its previous pronouncements,  and 
(ii)  Commission  action in this area,  in particular since 
1973.  It should be  added  that  a  Nuclear Safety Code  ap-
plicable to  the Member  States is not  a  stumbling block to 
wider international  cooperation within,  for example,  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Indeed the opposite 
is true. 
4.4.  The  Committee  consequently recognizes the need 
for Community  rules,  given the fact that nuclear safety 
p~blems must  be tackled in parallel with the progress of 
medium- and long-term energy policy. 
4.5.  The  public debate to which  these problems give 
rise in national parliaments  and in the European Parliament 
is of direct concern to  the population at large. 
4.6.  On  many  points these problems  are so  important as 
to transcend the Community  framework. 
4.7.  The  present  Study has been  confined to nuclear 
safety.  It has  placed the main  emphasis on the overriding 
need for safety rules  to  be  aligned at Community  level. - 33  -
4.3.  Despite the major research effort,  the  progress 
made  with Community  and  national rules,  the  experience gained 
and  th~  precaution~ of all kinds  that have  been  taken  in this 
area,  there are sti  l1  dj_vergences  which should  be  either 
explained  and  accepted,  or else abolished  by  Community  rules. 
4.9.  In view  of  the nature  of the risks  and  the possi-
bility of  excessive divergences arising in both  techno-
logical and  radiological protection as  a  result  of  the scale 
of current nuclear programmes  and  the rapid advance  of  tech-
nology  in this particular field,  a  Commtmj_ty  Code  must  be 
worked  out  on  the basis  of  joint concertation.  It should 
comprise minimum  rules whose  observance would  be supervised. 
Account  should also be  taken of  the  progress  of work  cur-
rently being carried  out  in this area by  the International 
Atomic  Energy Agency. 
4.10.  The  basic  objective  of  the Code  would  be  to allow 
optimum  development  of  the nuclear  industry from  the  point 
of view  of safety,  thus  promoting the use  of nuclear  energy 
for the benefit of society as  a  whole.  Tighter safety 
requirements  have  a  not  inconsiderable  impact  on  the  cost  of 
nuclear plants  and  on  lead times.  Although the Committee  is 
aware  of this aspect,  the safety of workers  and  the  public 
at large must  come  first. - 34  -- 35  -
A P P E N D I  C E S - 36  -- 37  -
Appendix  I 
COUNCIL  RESOLUTION  OF  ??.  JULY  1975  ON  THE  TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROBLEMS  OF  NUCL:t-;AR  SAFETY 
The  Council  of the  European  Communities, 
HAVING  REGARD  TO  the Treaty establishing the  European  Atomic 
Energy  Community; 
HAVING  REGARD  TO  the  Opinion  of  the  European  Parlia~ent (1); 
HAVTNG  REGARD  TO  the  Opinion  of  the  Economic  and  Social Com-
mittee; 
WHEREAS 
WHEREAS 
WHEREAS 
WHEREAS 
WHEREAS 
the Commi8sion  has forwarded  to  the Council  a 
communication  and  a  general report  on  tech-
nological  problems  of nuclear safety; 
it is necessary to keep  the public adequately 
informed  on  this subject; 
nuclear power has  a  considerable part to play 
in supplying energy  to the Community; 
the technological  problems  relating to nuclear 
safety,  particularly in view of their en-
vironmental  and health implications,  call for 
appropriate action at Community  level  which 
takes  into account  the  prerogatives  and 
responsibilities assumed  by national authori-
ties; 
by aligning safety requirements,  the national 
authorities responsible for nuclear safety and 
constructors and  energy producers will  be  able 
to benefit from  a  harmonized  approach to the 
problem at Community  level; 
(1)  OJ  No.  C  128  of  9  June  1975,  page  24. WH'F.RF,AS 
The  Council 
- 38  -
nuclear safety problems  extend  beyond  the 
frontiers not  only of Member  States but  of 
the  Community  as  a  whole,  and  it is  incum-
bent  on  the Commission  to act as  a  catalyst 
for initiatives to  be  taken  on  a  broader 
international plane. 
HEREBY  ADOPTS  THIS  RESOLT1l'ION 
1. requests  the Member  States as well as  the licensing 
authorities and  the safety and  inspection authorities  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  operators and  constructors  an  the 
other,  and  finally the agencies responsible for applied 
research programmes  to continue to collaborate  effec~ 
tively at Community  level; 
2.  agrees  to  the  course  of action in stages  indicated below 
by  the Commission  in respect of the progressive harmoni-
zation of safety requirements  and  criteria in order to 
provide  an equivalent  and  satisfactory degree  of pro-
tection of the population and  of the  environment against 
the risks  of radiation resulting from nuclear activities 
and  at the  same  time  to assist the development  of  trade 
on  the understanding that such harmonization should not 
involve  a~ lowering of  the safety level already attained; 
taking into account the state of industrial development  in 
the respective families  of high-power nuclear reactors, 
these stages  involve listing and  comparing the require-
ments  and criteria applied and  drawing-up  a  balance-sheet 
of similarities and  dissimilarities formulating as  soon 
as  possible recommendations  pursuant to the second  indent - 39  -
of Article  124  of  the  EURATOM  Treaty,  and  subsequently 
submitting to the Council  the most  suitable draft Com-
munity provisions; 
3. agrees  to strengthen Community  efforts to coordinate 
applied research programmes ·in  order to make  the best 
possible use  of  the resources  available  in the Community 
and  the Member  States both technically and financially 
whilst avoiding as far as  possible unnecessary duplication; 
these  efforts shall be  aimed at improving systematic 
exchanges  of  information,  promot1ng concerted action and 
cooperation between specialized bodies  and  institutes and 
stimulating where  appropriate the  development  of Community 
programmes; 
4. approves  of the methods  used  and  advocated by  the  Com-
mission,  namely,  meetings  of working parties  of 
specialized experts,  exchanges  of  information  on  specific 
operational  problems  and  analytical studies  and  syntheses 
with which  these  exper~s are associated; 
5. notes that  the measures  described above  may  require 
appropriations  in order to finance  analyses  and  syntheses 
and  the appropriate technical secretariat; 
6. requests  the Member  States to notify the Commission  of 
any draft laws,  regulations  or provisions  of similar 
scope concerning the safety of nuclear installations in 
order to enable the appropriate  consultations to be held 
at Community  level at the initiative of the Commission; - 40  -
74  requests the Member  States to seek  common  positions  on 
any  problems  concerning the  harmonization of require-
ments  and  criteria and  the coordination of research 
into nuclear safety being dealt with by international 
organizations; 
B.  requests the Commission to submit annual reports  on 
the progress made  and the Member  States and the Com-
mission to continue  and strengthen their efforts to 
ensure that the  public is given the best possible 
information about  both national and  Community  action 
in the field of nuclear safety. - 41  -
Ap-pendix  II 
"DIRIDT"  RESEARCH  PROJECTS  IN  THE  FIELD  OF  NUCLEAR  SAFETY 
INCLUDED  IN  THE  :MULTIANNUAL  RESEARCH  PROGRADE  OF  THE  JRC 
FOR  THE  PERIOD  1977-1980  ( 1 ) 
1.  Reactor Safety 
The  programme  comprises six projects covering the 
following research  : 
- reliability and risk assessment; 
- light water reactor loss of coolant accidents,  out-of-pile 
studies and  in-pile studies; 
- liquid metal fast breeder subassembly thermobydraulics; 
- fuel  coolant  interactions and  core melt-down; 
- dynamic  structure loading and response; 
- structural failure prevention. 
2.  Plutonium Fuels and  Actinide Research 
The  programme  compriseo  three projects covering 
the following research : 
- utilization limits of plutonium fuels; 
(1)  5<'urce  Doc.  COM(76)  171  final. - 42  -
- plutonium and  actinide aspects  of the  safety of the 
nuclear fuel  cycle; 
- actinide research. 
3.  Nuclear Materials  and  Radioactive Waste  Management 
The  programme  comprises  four projects covering 
the  following research  : 
- evaluation of the  long-term hazard  of radioactive waste 
disposal; 
- chemical separation and nuclear transmutation of 
actinides; 
- fuel materials management; 
- studies for decontamination of reactor components. - 43  -
Appendix  III 
"INDIRECT"  COMMUNITY  RESEARCH  PROJECTS  IN  THE  FIELD  OF 
NUCLEAR  SAFETY 
1. Biology- Health Protection ('Radiation Protection' 
Programme) 
Council Decision 
Duration of Programme 
15  March  1976  (1) 
5 years  (1  January  1976  to 
31  December  1980) 
Upper  Limit for Expenditure  commitment  :  39  million u.a.; 
Legal Basis 
Gist  of the Programme 
68  persons  (and  20  man/years 
for the infrastructure of the 
JRC/Ispra) 
Article 7  of the  EURATOM  Treaty 
The  purpose  of the programme  is to supplement, 
broaden and  deepen  the scientific and  technical knowledge 
necessary for  (i) deter-mining  and  updating the permissible 
radiation levels for man  and  the permissible  levels 
of contamination of  the various  components  of the environ-
ment,  and  (ii)  improving the practical organization of radia-
tion protection by  the Member  States. 
(1)  (Decision No.  76/309  Euratom)  OJ  No.  L 74  of  20  March  1976, 
page 32. - 44  -
This  aim  includes studies  on  the  paths which 
radioactive  contaminants  follow in man  and  the  environment, 
en the  effects of radiation on  living matter,  and  on  dosi-
metric  methods  and  instruments. 
The  activities are to be  carried out  mainly un,ler 
contracts  of association or shared-cost contracts,  a.nd.  partly 
by the  Commission's  Biology Group  at the  Ispra establishment. 
2.  Management  and Storage  of Radioactive Waste 
Council  Decision 
fr~ation of Programme 
Upncr Limit for Expenditure 
Commitments 
Legal  Basis 
Gist  of the Programme 
26  June  1975  (2) 
5  years  (1  January 1975  to 
31  December  1979) 
19.16 million u.a. 
four persons 
Article 7  of the  EURATOM 
Treaty 
The  purpose  of the  programme  is the  joint develop-
ment  and  perfecting of a  system of management  of radioactive 
waste  produced by the nuclear industry which,  at its various 
stages,  affords man  and his environment the best protection 
possible. 
(2)(Decision No.  75/406  Euratom)  OJ  No.  L  178  of 9  July 1975, 
page  28. - 45  -
In order that the  Commission  may  submit  suitable 
proposals at the earlieot opportunity,  the  programme  will 
seek to promote  : 
A.  Worl~ to  nolve certain technological problems posed  by  the 
processing storage nnd  disposal of radioactive waste. 
Processing 
medium-activity solid waste  :  coating \vith plastic resins; 
- high-activity solid waste  :  decontamination and  conditioning 
of irradiated fuel-element cladding; 
high-activity solid  ~~ste :  immobilization in a  metal matrix 
of calcined waste  from  fission products; 
- plutonium-contaminated nolid waste  :  incineration process; 
- comparo.tive  study  or- the properties of various materials 
suitable for the  immobilization of high-activity waste. 
Storage  and  disposal 
storage  o~ solidified radioactive waste  in engineered 
structureG; - 46  -
- disposal of radioactive waste  in suitable geological 
formations,  includine those  formattonn  currently being 
studied; 
- storncc of gaseous vm.r:!te. 
Stud..y  of an  advanced m.-maccment  model 
- separation and recycline of long life wn~te (actinides). 
B.  Wor1-::  contributing towards the definition of a  general 
frameVIork  (legal,  administrative,  financial)  for the 
implementation of radioactive waste  storage and disposal 
measures 
- review of problems posed  b,y  the management  of radioactive 
waste which cannot  be  solved under existing international 
legal,  administrative and financial provisions and propo-
sals for solutions; 
- study  of principles which  should govern the management  of 
radioactive waste. 
The  work  described in A and B will in the main  be 
carried out  b,y  means  of contracts. - 47  -
). Plutonium Recycling in Ligpt-Water Reactors 
Council Decision 
Duration of Programme 
Upper  Limit for Expenditure 
CoiDJIU tmen ts 
Le&J.l  Basis 
Gist  of the Programme 
17  December  1974  (3) 
four years  ( 1  January 1  975 
to  31  December  1978) 
4.5 million u.a. 
three persons 
Article 7  of the  EURATOM 
Treaty 
The  purpose  of the programme  is the  joint acquisi-
tion of data to  ensure  judicious use  of plutonium prior to 
the  operation of fast-breeder power  stations on  an industrial 
scale.  The  parts of the  programme  that ~ve to do  with 
nuclear Gafety  in particular are  : 
a)  r.ioni toring and  safety 
Some  problems  (e.g.  accident::;  due  to  the  loss of 
coola.'l'lt)  associated v:i th the monitoring and  safety of light-
water reactors differ from  reactor to reactor,  depending on 
whether plutonium or uranium is used as fuel.  There is a 
need for a  comparative technical study into the problems 
posed in the cores of plutonium-fuelled reactors,  with 
reference  to the monitoring and  safety systems  and health 
(3)  (Decision No.  74/642/EURATOM)  OJ  No.  L  349  of 
28  December  1974,  page 61. - 48  -
protection equipment,  in  order to  determine  what  changes 
must  be  made.  This  ntudy  nhould  also  show  to  what  extent it 
would  be  ponsible,  at a  later date,  to return to  the use  of 
urani  tun  fue  1. 
b)  Environmental Problems 
It was  stated in the Commisnion's memorandum 
which  formed  the  banio for  the Council's Decision that it 
would  be  uneful to  compare,  throughout  the  Community,  the 
problema  encountered in  : 
- obtninine operatine licences for,  and  operating,  fuel 
fabrication plants and plutonium-fuelled power  stations; 
- tr~~oporting plutonium in the  raw  ntate  (nitrate or oxide?) 
or in the  form  of ma.."lv.factured  fuel  elements; 
- storing plutonium (including "requalification"); 
- attempti~g to ensure protection ngninst any act of 
s~bot~se or piracy; 
and to  oecl~ a  solution to  thene  problema either through 
researc~ or by  meanb  of teats agreed  en  jointly. 
A programme  to align regulations and to brief the 
public may  also prove useful. European  Communities  - Economic  and  Social Committee 
"Community  nuclear safety code" 
Study  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
Brussels  :  General  Secretariat of the  Economic  and 
Social  Committee 
1CJ77  - 50  P• 
DK,  D,  E,  F,  I,  N. 
In its Study,  the  Committee  calls for  a  nuclear 
safety code  comprising a  set of minimum  rules  that would  be 
binding on  each Member  State.  The  code  would  cover all 
activities in the nuclear sector and  would  give absolute 
priority to  the safety of nuclear workers  and  the general 
public. 
r1:any  of  the  decisions  on  nuclear  energy hazards  Plt'e 
more  of a  social and  moral nature  than a  technical  one.  The 
Committee  therefore stresses  the need  to  involve  the general 
public.  Tbere must  be ready access to reliable and  com-
prehensive  information.  Decisions  on  the siting of nuclear 
power  stations must  be sutmitted to elected bodies  and  to 
the general public for their views. Rue  Ravenstein  2 
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